Indo-US Nuclear Deal: A Case Study in Indo-US Relations

Indo-US Nuclear Deal: A Case Study in Indo-US Relations Review

This book interrogates the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement from its inception in July 2005 to its conclusion in the latter part of 2008 through 12 articles, each of which focuses on different aspects of the deal. They discuss the factors that facilitated the deal, the roadblocks that were encountered, and the implications of the deal for the future of India’s foreign policy, its energy security and the international non-proliferation regime. Together, they address the internal political dynamics in India and the United States in order to present perspectives of both countries.

The book also highlights the technical paradigm of the nuclear deal: implications of the deal for India’s military and energy programs, and a legal scrutiny of the 123 Agreement. Further, it attempts to analyse the rationale for the unrelenting domestic and international opposition which the deal faced, examining . whether the objections raised from different groups at various stages to the Indo-US nuclear deal were substantive or motivated. Finally, the book provides an overview of the Indo-US nuclear deal and posits it within the larger framework of Indo-US relations.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of international relations, political science, international law, peace and security studies, South Asian studies and military studies.

The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation

The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation Review

Stephen M. Meyer steps back from the emotions and rhetoric surrounding the nuclear arms debates to provide a systematic examination of the underlying determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation. Looking at current theories of nuclear proliferation, he asks: Must a nation that acquires the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons eventually do so? In an analysis, remarkable for its rigor and accessibility, Meyer provides the first empirical, statistical model explaining why particular countries became nuclear powers when they did. His findings clearly contradict the notion that the pace of nuclear proliferation is controlled by a technological imperative and show that political and military factors account for the past decisions of nations to acquire or forgo the development of nuclear weapons.